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Violence and the Imaginary: Some Reflections 
on and around the Occupy Movement
di Bruno Gullì1
Abstract
Starting from the idea that we can distinguish between two main types of  the 
imaginary – the retrograde imaginary and the imaginary of  liberation, and following 
Michel Foucault’s distinction between dialectic and strategic logic, this essay seeks to 
outline a trajectory of  social and political change. The retrograde imaginary belongs 
to the sovereign and the sovereign police. The imaginary of  liberation belongs to the 
radical imagination and revolutionary movements, including the Occupy movement. 
The essay has a first more theoretical section, where the point is made that perhaps, in 
the contemporary world, especially in some areas such as the U.S., there is an ongoing 
reversion to obsolete forms of  domination. This would be a result of  the fact that 
the powers that be no longer have hegemony, and they consequently need to exert 
domination on the basis of  mere and raw violence. Or perhaps old and new forms of  
domination always coexist in such a way that sovereignty is present in all other forms 
of  domination. The second part of  the essay deals with some political matters that, 
originating in the U.S., have global importance. In particular, the essay offers an analysis 
of  the Obama administration’s defense of  the assassination program (especially the 
drone strikes) that is becoming a matter of  great global, political and moral, concern. 
The essay ends with the idea that liberation movements, such as the Occupy movement, 
can provide an exit from the dominant logic of  violence and from the increasingly 
troubling world’s situation.
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For Abdulrahman al-Awlaki, born in Denver, 
Colorado, on September 13, 1995, killed by a U.S. 
drone strike in Yemen on October 14, 2011.
“The sovereigns who willingly agreed to 
present themselves as cops or executioners, in 
fact, now show in the end their original proximity 
to the criminal.”
Giorgio Agamben, Sovereign Police.
1 Bruno Gullì was born in Calabria and has lived in the US for many years. He has 
taught at various higher education institutions in New York, lives in Brooklyn, and is 
the author of  two books: Labor of  Fire: the Ontology of  Labor between Economy and Culture 
(2005) and Earthly Plenitudes: a Study on Sovereignty and Labor (2010).
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The above Agamben citation can be used to address the question of  
the “apparatus” (dispositif)22within which a double imaginary has played, 
and is playing, a pivotal role. Thus, we have two types of  imaginary. One 
is the imaginary tending to the defense of  the status quo; it is, in fact, the 
sovereign imaginary, the imaginary of  the police, and of  the sovereign 
police, of  debt and death, of  exchange value and of  the total privatization 
and financialization of  life. This is the imaginary for which the apparatus 
of  repression and of  production of  new and better forms of  subjection 
must be perfected and refined: new forms of  discipline, of  punishment 
and pre-punishment. The other is the imaginary of  liberation exemplified 
by, among other recent situations, the Occupy Movement, which seeks 
the dismantling and destruction of  the repressive and coercive dominant 
apparatus (or system). 
Following Foucault, I will try to describe a strategic rather than 
dialectical logic, and I will try to show that ultimately it is the autonomy 
of  the imagination and will to liberation, rather than their dialogical and 
dialectical encounter with a rotten system of  domination, that may turn 
into an actual reality what has now for long been the cry and program 
of  progressive thinking and practice under the slogan “another world is 
possible.”
In the second lecture of  The Birth of  Biopolitics, Foucault distinguishes 
between dialectical and strategic logic. He says: 
Dialectical logic puts to work contradictory terms within 
the homogeneous. I suggest replacing this dialectical logic with 
what I would call a strategic logic. A logic of  strategy does not 
stress contradictory terms within a homogeneity that promises 
their resolution in a unity. The function of  strategic logic is 
to establish the possible connections between disparate terms 
2 Agamben (2009).
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which remain disparate. The logic of  strategy is the logic of  
connections between the heterogeneous and not the logic of  the 
homogenization of  the contradictory (2004, p. 42).
 
From the point of  view of  dialectical logic, of  the homogeneous 
and its potential unity, a social and political struggle will hardly lead to 
liberation, but it will rather lead to a return of  sort to what now appears 
to be a new condition, where the sublated terms are still present in their 
apparent absence, but essentially present; neither has gone over into the 
other, neither has been eliminated. To the contrary, the heterogeneity of  
strategic logic allows for spaces of  alterity. What is named here is not 
another whose destiny is assimilation into a (new) one, but a simple other, 
one-other-than, which has no destiny (or necessity), but is pure contingency. 
This is also what the notion of  dignity of  individuation I formulated in 
Earthly Plenitudes (Gullì, 2010) names – a singularity.
To be sure, in the passage I cited above, Foucault is not saying that 
strategic logic is necessarily, or primarily, a logic of  liberation. In fact, he 
is saying that it is the logic of  liberalism, whereby various apparatuses 
(dispositifs) are found in a situation of  tension and friction with 
one another.33However, precisely because of  this – because of  the 
heterogeneous character of  the relation, because of  the multiplicity 
involved, there remains the possibility that the struggle, the war, may 
create spaces of  irreducible alterity. As Maurizio Lazzarato explains, “[s]
ometimes the government plays one dispositif  against the other; sometimes 
it relies on one, sometimes on the other.” And that is, for instance, the 
juridical, economic, or social dispositif.44However, precisely because the 
governed are not involved in a dialectical (or dialogical) relation tending to 
a unity, but are rather left, subjected, in the facticity of  being “object[s] 
3 See Lazzarato, “Biopolitics/Bioecomomics: a politics of  multiplicity”, see http://www.
generation-online.org/p/fplazzarato2.htm
4 Ibid.
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of  information, never... subject[s] in communication” (Foucault, 1977, p. 
200), they can, precisely on that account, start and implement strategies 
other than those of  the established apparatuses, whereby the latter ruin 
and collapse. This is precisely what has been happening with the Occupy 
Movement, where, for instance, clashing with the police is of  course not the 
aim. The clashes are the result of  a unilateral type of  violence, unleashed 
by the government itself, exercised by ill-advised and thoughtless (and 
often extremely vicious) police officers, who would do much better if  they 
read (the right) books, reeducated themselves, in order to understand their 
place in history and society, their (up to now betrayed) membership in the 
99% section of  society. 
This violence is of  course not the result of  a secret maneuver of  a 
few people in high governmental positions, but rather the spirit of  the 
network of  apparatuses (including the police in the narrow sense), which, 
in addition to legitimizing the dirty work of  control and surveillance, 
intimidation and repression, also tries to create and maximize a degree 
of  consensus among the subjected population. To this purpose, nothing 
works better than the rhetoric of  the need for security from the threat of  
terror – a rhetoric totally supported and duly disseminated by mainstream 
media. This is not to say that those who manage to get to high positions 
of  power (from the president or prime minister of  a nation to its attorney 
general to the mayors of  cities large and small, and so on) have nothing to 
do with this. As I have noted, the violence we are experiencing is unleashed 
by the leading governments themselves. However, these ‘leaders’ are only 
willful (and superficial) agents of  forms of  coercion and repression, whose 
origin is more systemic and structural. These original forms themselves 
are nothing but a usurpation of  a totally different power, usually referred 
to as the power of  the people. Many people would not agree with this 
description, but I think that a strong argument can be made to show that 
we are dealing with forms of  usurpation of  a more fundamental, and 
essentially different, power. Those who would disagree would probably 
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say that institutional positions of  power are, at least in our ‘democratic’ 
society, occupied by elected officials or others appointed by our elected 
officials. They ultimately rest on that celebrated principle of  the power 
of  the people. But everybody knows that this is utterly false, because 
the separation between the government and the governed, a mark of  
sovereignty, is such that what should be power in the people turns to 
powerlessness, subjectivity turns to subjection, freedom to unfreedom, 
communication to the facticity of  surveillance and control. Moreover, the 
very concept of  the people is today called into question, and rightly so, 
by the theorists of  the multitude5, for the people is one only in relation to 
the sovereign sign, and thus as soon as its power is falsely posited in the 
phrase ‘the power of  the people,’ it is also taken away by the assimilation 
of  the many (concrete people) into the unity of  a totally imaginary one, 
which is the one crushed under the sovereign sign: ‘one nation under god,’ 
the highest and most accomplished sovereign. 
Speaking of  sovereignty may be a bit problematic here because I am 
making use of, and perhaps misusing, some categories from Foucault. 
In fact, Foucault distinguishes between the modality of  sovereignty and 
more general forms of  domination, which take the place of  sovereignty 
or coexist with it (Foucault, 1997). However, I think that all forms of  
domination have a regard for the logic of  sovereignty, an anticipation or 
residue of  it. Moreover, I think that lately, despite the crisis of  sovereignty 
at the level of  the politics of  states and international relations – the 
Westphalian model of  sovereignty, we are witnessing a newly arising 
form of  it, precisely in the sense of  Agamben’s notion of  the sovereign 
police. But sovereign police does not mean only the fact that policing now 
happens on a global scale, namely, the fact, highlighted by Agamben, that 
heads of  states can be arrested, removed, and executed. It also means that 
the police everywhere retain the trait of  the sovereign and use and abuse it 
5 See especially Virno (2004) and Hardt and Negri (2004 and 2009).
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along with their batons, guns, pepper-spray, water cannons, and so on. The 
two aspects of  the sovereign police come together in a very interesting 
and clear way in the assassination program recently launched, or escalated 
and enhanced, by the Obama administration. We now know that Barack 
Obama himself, today’s most powerful sovereign on earth, is ‘personally 
involved’ in the assassination program, and he picks and chooses from a 
‘kill list.’6
Before addressing that, I want to remark on something that Foucault 
says in The Birth of  Biopolitics, while he is himself  remarking on aspects of  
his own book Discipline and Punish. In discussing the new governmental 
reason, “interested in interests,” a thing that follows from the logic of  
strategy I discussed above, he gives a brief  synopsis of  what is one of  
the main theses in Discipline and Punish, the change in the penal system, in 
the eighteenth century, from punishment as the direct intervention of  the 
sovereign (hence torture and execution) to the “principle of  mildness in 
punishment... which, once again, was not the expression of  something like 
a change in people’s sensibility” (2004, p. 46-47). In Discipline and Punish, in 
a chapter called “Generalized punishment,” Foucault says: 
The reform of  criminal law must be read as a strategy for the 
rearrangement of  the power to punish, according to modalities 
that render it more regular, more effective, more constant and 
more detailed in its effects; in short, which increase its effects 
while diminishing its economic cost... and its political cost (1977, 
pp. 80-81).
 
The emphasis on the word ‘strategy’ in the above citation is mine. The 
point was “not to punish less, but to punish better” (p. 82). Foucault had 
already previously noted in the text, and he will note again later in the 
6 Commenting on the recent New York Times article that has revealed the secret 
‘kill list’ news, the journalist Chris Floyd correctly speaks of  “Obama’ murder racket” and 
of  a “death squad that Obama is personally directing from the White House.” See http://www.
nytexaminer.com/2012/05/hymns-to-the-violence-the-nyts-love-letter-to-obamas-murder-racket/
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same chapter, that the idea was that punishment should replace revenge 
(pp. 74 and 90), which was the modality typical of  the direct and personal 
intervention of  the sovereign being now superseded by the new strategy 
within criminal justice for the sake of  the defense of  society. One last 
quote: 
It became necessary to define a strategy and techniques of  
punishment in which an economy of  continuity and permanence 
would replace that of  expenditure and excess (p. 87; emphasis 
added).
 
The last two words in the above passage obviously bring to mind Georges 
Bataille, for whom sovereignty was precisely ‘expenditure’ and ‘excess,’ that 
which does not serve, and who has a curious way of  ultimately assigning 
sovereignty a potentially revolutionary character. Perhaps even more 
important is to note that the new economy of  continuity and permanence, 
the new strategy of  normalization, replacing the sovereign modality of  
vengeance, also implies the end of  the exception, which is the sovereign’s 
most characteristic trait, as Carl Schmitt famously stressed (Schmitt, 2005). 
This is why Foucault speaks of  generalized punishment, which of  course 
includes all possible forms of  pre-punishment and collective punishment. 
Back from Foucault’s genealogy of  the new strategy in criminal law 
to the present role and practice of  the sovereign police in our societies, 
at the global and local level, there seem to be some interesting questions 
arising. First, is there a regression today to previous and obsolete forms of  
power, punishment, and control? Have these forms perhaps never been 
superseded? Or is there (and has there been all along) a combination of  
the old and the new, that is to say, yes, new and more efficient strategy and 
techniques, but coupled with the old sovereign right to punish and take 
revenge? I have a sense that the last question can give us an insight into 
what the situation truly is today. First of  all, it supports the idea that there 
is anticipation, or a residue, of  sovereignty in domination as such; in other 
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words, that the sign of  sovereignty is still impressed everywhere, visible 
everywhere. But it also says that, if  Foucault’s analysis has any value – and 
I think it does indeed have great value, old forms of  power that seemed to 
be fading (and Foucault never says they had completely disappeared) are 
perhaps today gaining new strength for reasons that must be explained. 
One reason might be that a gasping power, one that has dominance 
without hegemony (Arrighi 1994 and 2007)7, needs to revert to forms that 
had at one point in time perhaps become unnecessary and even useless, 
while at the same time devise new forms to make sure it is still in charge, 
still in control. Thus, the sovereign intervention may today take on the 
form of  drone attacks, while at the same time refining the machinery of  
control and surveillance with more sophisticated and refined techniques 
by opaque agencies, such as the National Security Agency, or even the New 
York Police Department (for instance, one may think of  the recent news 
about the NYPD surveillance of  Muslim people and businesses miles 
away from its jurisdiction, in New Jersey and Connecticut). Moreover, the 
police intervene in a sovereign manner; that is to say, they do not simply 
intervene in the typical role and function of  the police, but they intervene 
from the site of  absolute and supreme power typical of  the sovereign and 
according to the sovereign’s modalities of  intimidation and vengeance. We 
see this every time people take to the streets to protest allover the world: 
the Arab Spring, the Indignados in Europe, and many other situations of  
opposition to regimes of  violence everywhere. In the US, this has regularly 
been the case since the Occupy Movement started in September 2011 – 
though it might be interesting to note that some eight months before that, 
during the Wisconsin Uprising, the police joined the protest. And again, 
the action of  the police is sovereign in all cases of  police brutality, which 
are increasing exponentially and becoming more and more vicious and 
appalling. It might also be noted that police abuse of  power does not start 
with episodes of  brutality, but with the very intimidating and aggressive 
7 The phrase is originally from Guha (1992), quoted and amplified in Arrighi (1994 
and 2007).
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presence of  the police, whether it be at political demonstrations and rallies 
or in the city’s everyday life, especially of  course in some areas of  the 
city chosen for special measures of  surveillance, repression and control 
according to a racist logic of  violence. What becomes apparent is that it is 
not the case that a regime of  the norm has replaced the sovereign regime 
of  the exception, but rather that the exception has become the norm, and 
consequently that the sign of  sovereignty is now everywhere. 
The ubiquity of  sovereignty, of  the sovereign police (and here police 
should be understood in its broadest sense), is easily seen in the culture 
of  impunity and unaccountability that certainly after 9/11 has engulfed 
the world. There are clear signs of  this at the global level (drone strikes) 
as well as at the local level (police arrogance and brutality). What I am 
trying to do, though in a cursory and schematic manner, is link these 
two levels of  everyday life, which are often seen in separation, but are 
instead intimately connected today. That there is sovereignty, rather 
than simply unsovereign domination, should be clear from the very 
meaning of  ‘impunity’ and ‘unaccountability,’ as well as from their place 
in theology, where the doctrine of  sovereignty originates. Impunity and 
unaccountability are certainly moments in god’s essence. Who would god 
be accountable to? Humans, perhaps. But this only moments before god’s 
death, and only as long as the human adventure is still unfolding, which 
will not be forever. Indeed, god is the impune and unaccountable One. 
Its infinite distance, whether of  the infinitely small or infinitely large type, 
that is to say, regardless of  whether god is the nearest or the farthest, or 
both, is such that it makes communication impossible (or conversation for 
that matter, as per Hölderlin’s sad and tragic insight). 
Then, we can ask Hölderlin’s question: What is this? It is, for instance, 
the police barricade, the gun and the baton, the NATO summit in Chicago 
and the removed G8 summit to Camp David, the universities’ boards of  
trustees and the Wall Street executives; it is the screen, the society of  the 
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spectacle, which has us subjected, disciplined, pre-punished, and docile. It is 
in any case the separation in the metaphysics of  everyday life – a separation 
that must be exploded and eliminated.
The attempts at justifying and legitimizing the usurpation of  power, the 
abuse of  power, inscribed in the formula of  sovereignty and domination 
are of  no help at all. We hear about these attempts every time the 
spokesperson for a city’s police department or for the State Department, 
after an episode of  police brutality or a massacre or other atrocities in a 
war zone, says that “This is not who we are or what we stand for.” Not to 
speak about when we hear, articulated in full transparency, that this is indeed 
who we are and what we stand for. To give an eminent example, this is 
the case when John Brennan, chief  counterterrorism advisor to president 
Obama, informs the American people that, yes, it is true that 
the United States Government conducts targeted strikes 
against specific al-Qaeda terrorists, sometimes using remotely 
piloted aircrafts, often referred to publicly as drones.8 
Of  course, he does not say that these ‘terrorists’ are very often regular 
and innocent people (at times children) or insurgents and rebels. He insists 
that all is lawful, and he stresses that it is in accordance with international 
law. Before saying that “[t]argeted strikes are wise” (probably ‘smart’ 
would have been a better choice of  word), he lays out the four principles 
to which said strikes conform. The principles of  necessity, distinction, and 
proportionality are the first three principles. The principle of  necessity 
requires “that the targets have definite military value,” but of  course the 
determination of  value is always a very tricky matter. The principle of  
distinction is very reasonable, for it simply says that “only military objectives 
may be intentionally targeted and that civilians are protected from being 
8 http://content.usatoday.com/communities/theoval/post/2012/04/obama-administration-
details-rationale-for-covert-drone-war/1#.T8MH-8U7Uko
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intentionally targeted.” I think that anyone would agree that the distinction 
between military objectives and civilians is an important one, and it should 
be a clear-cut distinction, although this goes back to the question of  the 
definition of  value, as per principle one. In fact, it is difficult to understand 
why even make it into a principle, if  it were not for the telling repetition 
of  the word ‘intentionally.’ Obviously, “protected from being intentionally 
targeted” does not entail protected from being targeted9. The principle of  
proportionality is a small philosophical jewel. It says that “the anticipated 
collateral damage of  an action cannot be excessive in relation to the 
anticipated military advantage.” Strictly understood, this principle would 
disqualify many military actions as legitimate actions. For instance, on the 
basis of  such a principle one would not have dropped the atomic bombs on 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki, or perhaps one would have, for proportionality 
is a very relative concept, and then, remember, as always it all depends 
on how many American lives are involved. So the first three principles all 
have nice names. Especially the first two: necessity and distinction, with 
their obvious philosophical connotation. But even proportionality has its 
merit, especially due to the reflexive manner of  its formulation. Yet, the 
best principle is the fourth one, the principle of  humanity, “which requires 
us to use weapons that will not inflict unnecessary suffering.”10 Here, 
Foucault’s account of  the change in punishment comes back in full force. 
The public and spectacular execution with whose account Discipline and 
Punish begins, the torture, dismemberment and quartering of  Damiens, 
the regicide (who in any case had not succeeded in killing the king), would 
certainly be a poor model for our principle of  humanity. A remotely 
piloted aircraft, also known as drone, fits the principle much better. It 
is faster, somewhat cleaner, more efficient, and certainly removed from 
direct view and experience. It may be captured on a camera, reproduced 
on the screen, especially the destruction and ruin after the strike. “The 
spectators,” we ourselves, can still be “edified” (I am repeating some 
9 I owe this observation to Nino Gullì.
10http://www.npr.org/2012/05/01/151778804/john-brennan-delivers-speech-on-drone-ethics 
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words from the account of  the Damiens execution given by a publication 
of  the time, 1757, and cited by Foucault at the outset of  Discipline and 
Punish). What’s important is that there is no unnecessary suffering; that would 
be a savagery, a bestiality, which we leave to the terrorists. After all, this 
is not who we are or what we stand for. The paragraph containing the 
principle of  humanity, no doubt the highest of  the four principles, ends 
as follows: “For these reasons, I suggest to you that these targeted strikes 
against al-Qaeda terrorists are indeed ethical and just”11 (emphasis added). 
They are just because these people are terrorists, so we are justified in 
killing them; they also are ethical because, even in terrorists, we respect 
the principle of  humanity. In other words, as usual, we are good, they are 
evil. And we are exceptionally good, perhaps infinitely good, for we are 
capable of  great acts of  kindness even to the ones who are exceptionally 
or infinitely evil. What the self-legitimizing sovereign discourse omits to 
say is that the drone strikes are terrorist acts in their own right. Brennan’s 
speech is not different from the speeches we often hear from Netanyahu 
and other Israeli officials in defense of  their ongoing murderous attacks 
on the Palestinian people, and it is not very different, for that matter, from 
the defense that the Syrian government repeats of  their crackdown on the 
uprising, though it is not very clear at this point what the real situation is 
in Syria.
We can then go back to the Agamben quotation I am using as an 
epigraph for this essay: 
The sovereigns who willingly agreed to present themselves as 
cops or executioners, in fact, now show in the end their original 
proximity to the criminal (2000, p. 107). 
The statement is not saying that the sovereign, the corrupt sovereign for 
instance, is capable of  criminal acts. Instead, the idea is that the sovereign, 
11 Ibid.
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and this includes the highest and most accomplished One, is an outlaw 
according to its “original” meaning. The sovereign is an outlaw because he 
is above the law. He is above the law insofar as he is the lawmaker. Being 
himself  the law, the sovereign seems to coincide with the limit, touching 
upon the inside, deciding about the inside, yet having absolute access to 
the outside – an access denied to those who remain (trapped) within the 
sovereign web. But truly, the sovereign is not the limit; rather, he is this 
open and absolute access to what lies beyond the limit, which he establishes 
at will and on the basis of  mere violence, or the threat of  violence. 
It is this situation that the Occupy Movement, like all revolutionary 
movements, challenges. The limit must go, the separation be exploded. 
The sovereign is useless and harmful – a useless burden, a harmful parasite. 
The imaginary of  liberation shatters the logic of  inside and outside, and 
occupying goes beyond the limit. Its strategy exposes sovereign violence. 
More than simply nonviolent in a generic sense (i.e., where nonviolence 
seems to imply a notion of  submission, if  not an act of  compliance), 
the strategy seems to be close to what Antonio Gramsci described as a 
war of  position. Gramsci famously distinguished between a war of  position 
and a war of  maneuver. The latter happens when the revolutionary 
movement has the capacity to overpower the dominant (though perhaps 
no longer hegemonic) system: the State, its police, etc. The former has 
the (perhaps hidden and surprising) capacity to let the system fall of  its 
own accord. This means that the system does and does not fall of  its own 
accord. It does insofar as no direct and physical blow is exerted on it; 
yet, it does not insofar as without the war of  position it would endure 
and linger in its fetid putrescence. It is in this sense that one speaks 
of  nonviolence, though it is really what Walter Benjamin paradoxically 
(and problematically) calls sovereign violence (1978, p. 300). This unviolent 
violence, which is ‘sovereign’ because it deactivates the mechanism (or 
apparatus) of  the limit, is nothing but the individuation of  dignity, which 
is in turn the condition for the possibility of  a prosperous, peaceful, and 
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common humanity. Another way of  addressing this would be to call it 
counterviolence, following Frantz Fanon (2004). However, by deactivating 
the mechanism of  violence, sovereign (divine) violence, which is “lethal 
without spilling blood” (Benjamin, p. 297), clears the ground for a new 
ontology and a new history of  humankind. It counters violence in the most 
essential way, for it destroys it. It is then counter-violence in the strictest, 
most literal sense: a standing against, whereby that-against-which it stands 
is totally annihilated. 
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